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I.  INTRODUCTION1 
The late Richard E. Speidel, my longtime friend and co-author, was 
Professor of Law at the University of Virginia (1966–1977), Boston 
University (1977–1980), Northwestern University (1980–2007), and the 
University of San Diego (2000–2007).2  While Dick, as he was known, 
Professor James J. White, known as Jim, of the University of Michigan 
Law School, and I, were attending an Association of American Law 
Schools annual meeting in Chicago in the mid-1960s, Mr. Roger Noreen 
of the West Publishing Company—as it was then called—arranged for 
us to meet together.  He then invited us to co-author and co-edit teaching 
materials for so-called integrated U.C.C. courses in law schools devoted 
to the Uniform Commercial Code (Code or U.C.C.).  In this period, the 
Code was being adopted across the United States by the state legislatures, 
and it was also adopted by Congress for federal jurisdictions. 
Dick, Jim, and I threw ourselves into the West book project, and the 
first edition of R. Speidel, R. Summers, and J. White, Teaching Materials 
on Commercial Transactions, published by West, appeared in 1969.3  
The casebook was soon widely adopted for use in second- and third-year 
courses in American law schools, and it continued to be so used for 
many years.  However, so-called curriculum reform in the law schools 
ultimately led to abandonment of integrated commercial law courses in 
most law schools and the casebooks for such courses naturally fell into 
relative disuse. 
Speidel, White, and I worked together from the mid-1960s, and not 
only as co-authors.  We, of course, taught the U.C.C. in courses at our 
own law schools, and in these courses, we used the book we had co-
authored in various updated editions.  We also gave dozens of invited 
lectures over many years on the U.C.C. and on general contract law 
across the country to lawyer groups and to members of the judiciary.  
We also gave many special lectures on the Code and contract law to 
students and faculty at various law schools.  The U.C.C. had been drafted in 
the 1950s in large part by one of the truly great commercial law minds of 
the twentieth century, Karl N. Llewellyn of the University of Chicago 
 
 1. This short piece on good faith in honor of the late Richard E. Speidel is the 
third publication of mine on good faith.  The two earlier ones are much longer and are: 
Robert S. Summers, “Good Faith” in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REV. 195 (1968) [hereinafter Summers, Good 
Faith], and Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith—Its Recognition and 
Conceptualization, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 810 (1982) [hereinafter Summers, General Duty]. 
 2. See ASS’N OF AM. LAW SCHS., THE AALS DIRECTORY OF LAW TEACHERS 
2006–2007, at 1038 (2006). 
 3. RICHARD E. SPEIDEL ET AL., TEACHING MATERIALS ON COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS 
(1969). 
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Law School, who served as Chief Reporter of the Code project. 4  This 
made our lecturing, writing, and other work together on this subject all 
the more inspired and absorbing.  Richard Speidel was an extraordinarily 
fine lecturer—informative, up-to-date, well organized, clear, and sometimes 
even quite humorous! 
After a distinguished career teaching and writing in the fields of contracts, 
commercial law, and arbitration law, Professor Speidel retired from full-
time teaching in 2007.  He continued to teach part-time as a member of 
the San Diego Law Faculty until 2008. 
In addition to being a fine scholar, teacher, and colleague, Richard 
Speidel was a remarkable friend.  It was my privilege to know him well 
for more than forty-five years.  I, of course, learned a great deal working 
with him on the U.C.C. and general contract law.  He had a deep and 
wide-ranging grasp of the U.C.C., the accumulating case law thereunder, 
and general contract law.  Also, he was always eager to share his 
understanding and to engage in discussion. 
One of Professor Speidel’s favorite subjects was good faith in general 
contract law and under the U.C.C.  He discussed good faith in various 
writings.  He devoted one entire article of his to this subject.5  Here, in 
regard to the U.C.C., I will focus, but only in a general way, on U.C.C. 
section 1-304—formerly section 1-203—which imposes a general obligation 
of good faith.  I will also address, but again only in a general way, the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts and general contract law dealing with 
good faith.  I will not undertake to provide extended analyses of the 
U.C.C. or Restatement, nor extended analyses of the case law under the 
Code or in general contract law.  To do that would require several 
articles or a book, and my earlier articles offer extended analyses.6  In 
addition, the White and Summers treatise on the U.C.C.—now in its fifth 
edition—includes extensive analyses of Code case law.7 
 
 4. See General Comment to U.C.C., 1 U.L.A. xix (2004).  Professor Llewellyn’s 
initial and enduring interest in contracts and commercial law was fostered by his mentors 
at Yale Law School, Arthur Corbin and Wesley Hohfeld.  See Steve Sheppard, Introduction 
to KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH, at ix, xv (2008). 
 5. Richard E. Speidel, The “Duty” of Good Faith in Contract Performance and 
Enforcement, 46 J. LEGAL EDUC. 537 (1996). 
 6. See articles cited supra note 1. 
 7. JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: PRACTITIONER 
TREATISE (5th ed. 2006). 
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II.  THE GENERAL IMPORTANCE OF THE OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH 
I believe there is no obligation in all of the U.C.C. and in general 
contract law of more overall importance than the general obligation of 
good faith.  It can come into play in almost any contractual setting.8  
When in play, its bearing can be of profound import.  It can fill significant 
gaps in contracts.  It can operate to qualify statutory law and case law.  It 
can invoke remedies.  It can even operate to override some law. 
Well-advised contracting parties, when duly alerted, may be called 
upon to alter their behavior in major ways to avoid breach of the duty of 
good faith.  Moreover, breach of the duty can bring into operation major 
forms of remedial law.  Not only monetary damages and other remedies 
may become available, but certain defenses may come into play, too. 
As indicated, the general obligation of good faith appears in the 
U.C.C. and in general contract law, including section 205 of the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts.  It also appears in various official 
comments of the U.C.C.  It is widely invoked not only in general 
contract case law but also in U.C.C. case law.9  The obligation has been 
and continues to be the subject of extensive scholarly writing.10 
III.  THE GENERAL OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH UNDER THE U.C.C. 
The general obligation of good faith under the U.C.C. is set forth in 
section 1-304 of the Code, which is substantially the same as former 
section 1-203.  Section 1-304, entitled “Obligation of Good Faith,” provides: 
 
 8. See Summers, Good Faith, supra note 1, at 216 (“Cases have been discovered 
which, if taken as a whole rather than by states, require good faith at every stage of the 
contractual process, from preliminary negotiation through performance to discharge, and 
in nearly all kinds of contracts.”). 
 9. See, e.g., Tymshare, Inc. v. Covell, 727 F.2d 1145 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Fremont 
v. E.I. DuPont DeNemours, 988 F. Supp. 870 (E.D. Pa. 1997); Dunlap v. State Farm Fire 
& Cas. Co., 878 A.2d 434 (Del. 2005); Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 408 N.E.2d 1370 
(Mass. 1980); Aluevich v. Harrah’s, 660 P.2d 986 (Nev. 1983); Centronics Corp. v. 
Genicom Corp., 562 A.2d 187 (N.H. 1989); Best v. U.S. Nat’l Bank of Or., 739 P.2d 554 
(Or. 1987).  Indeed, the case law here is vast. 
 10. See, e.g., Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance of a Contract: A 
Reply to Professor Summers, 69 IOWA L. REV. 497 (1984) [hereinafter Burton, Reply]; 
Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good 
Faith, 94 HARV. L. REV. 369 (1980); E. Allan Farnsworth, Good Faith Performance and 
Commercial Reasonableness Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 30 U. CHI. L. REV. 
666 (1963); Emily M.S. Houh, The Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law: A (Nearly) 
Empty Vessel?, 2005 UTAH L. REV. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Houh, Empty Vessel]; Emily 
M.S. Houh, Critical Interventions: Toward an Expansive Equality Approach to the 
Doctrine of Good Faith in Contract Law, 88 CORNELL L. REV. 1025 (2003); Saul 
Litvinoff, Good Faith, 71 TUL. L. REV. 1645 (1997); Dennis M. Patterson, Wittgenstein 
and the Code: A Theory of Good Faith Performance and Enforcement Under Article 
Nine, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 335 (1988). 
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“Every contract or duty within [the Uniform Commercial Code] imposes 
an obligation of good faith in its performance and enforcement.”11  Most 
states have adopted section 1-304 or a virtually identical provision.12 
The official comments to section 1-304 state that “[t]his section sets 
forth a basic principle running throughout the Uniform Commercial 
Code.”13  The official comments also explain that the principle applies 
more broadly than merely to those situations in which a specific code 
provision explicitly states an obligation of good faith.  Rather, the good faith 
principle extends generally “to the performance or enforcement of every 
contract or duty within [the] Act.”14  In addition, the comments state that 
the Code’s general obligation of good faith is “further implemented by 
Section 1-303 on course of dealing, course of performance, and usage of 
trade.”15 
The comments also include an important clarification to the effect that 
section 1-304 on good faith “does not support an independent cause of 
action for failure to perform or enforce in good faith.”  Rather, section  
1-304 provides “that a failure to perform or enforce, in good faith, a 
specific duty or obligation under the contract, constitutes a breach of that 
contract or makes unavailable, under the particular circumstances, a 
remedial right or power.”16  The comments also stress that “the doctrine 
of good faith merely directs a court towards interpreting contracts within 
the commercial context in which they are created, performed, and enforced, 
and does not create a separate duty of fairness and reasonableness which 
can be independently breached.”17 
Although section 1-304 states the general obligation to act in good 
faith, the actual definition of good faith appears in a separate section of 
the Code.  Prior to 2001, former section 1-201(19) defined good faith 
 
 11. U.C.C. § 1-304 (2008) (alteration in original).  The official comment to section 
1-304 explains that “[e]xcept for changing the form of reference to the Uniform Commercial 
Code, this section is identical to former Section 1-203.”  Id. § 1-304 cmt. (providing a 
summary of “[c]hanges from former law”). 
 12. See U.C.C. § 1-304 (amended 2001), 1 U.L.A. 22 (Supp. 2009).  See also Nat’l 
Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, A Few Facts About the Revised Uniform 
Commercial Code Article 1, General Provisions 2001, http://www.nccusl.org/Update/ 
uniformact_factsheets/uniformacts-fs-ucc1.asp (last visited Aug. 1, 2009) (listing thirty-
four states that have adopted the Revised U.C.C. Article 1 General Provisions of 2001). 
 13. U.C.C. § 1-304 cmt. 1 (2008). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. (emphasis added). 
 17. Id. 
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narrowly as “honesty in fact in the conduct or transaction concerned.”18  
Now, however, section 1-201(b)(20) defines good faith more broadly to 
include “honesty in fact and the observance of reasonable commercial 
standards of fair dealing.”19  As the official comments make clear, there 
is a significant difference between former section 1-201(19) and current 
section 1-201(b)(20).  The former section’s definition of good faith 
“contained no element of commercial reasonableness.”20  The present 
section, by contrast, is “comprised of two elements—honesty in fact and 
the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing.”21  
One commentator recently explained the change as follows: “[T]he new 
standard for determining good faith under Article 1 is no longer only 
subjective, but rather requires decision-makers to use both a subjective 
and an objective standard, incorporating fairness.”22 
Good faith is not explicitly conceptualized in Code text or comments 
as an “excluder,” though there are some Code cases invoking this concept, 
which operates to rule out or exclude various forms of bad faith.23  Now 
turning to the excluder concept, which is a concept that found its way 
into the Restatement and general contract law. 
IV.  THE GENERAL OBLIGATION OF GOOD FAITH UNDER THE 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS AND IN GENERAL                  
CONTRACT LAW—GOOD FAITH AS AN “EXCLUDER” 
Section 205 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts provides that 
“[e]very contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair 
dealing in its performance and its enforcement.”24  Along with the comment 
and Reporter’s note that accompany it, section 205 acknowledges the 
existence of a general duty of good faith in American contract law. 
It has recently been observed that an article of mine on good faith that 
appeared in the Virginia Law Review in 196825 “has since become one of 
 
 18. Id. § 1-201(19) (2000). 
 19. Id. § 1-201(b)(20) (2008). 
 20. Id. § 1-201 cmt. 20. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Margaret L. Moses, The New Definition of Good Faith in Revised Article 1, 35 
UCC L.J. 47, 47 (2002).  Many of the good faith cases on bad faith in performance and 
enforcement under the U.C.C. remain good law today.  See, e.g., Orange & Rockland Utils., 
Inc. v. Amerada Hess Corp., 397 N.Y.S.2d 814, 819–22 (App. Div. 1977). 
 23. See, e.g., Dunlap v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 878 A.2d 434, 441 (Del. 2005) 
(“Despite its evolution, the term ‘good faith’ has no set meaning, serving only to ‘exclude a 
wide range of heterogeneous forms of bad faith.’”); Zapatha v. Dairy Mart, Inc., 408 
N.E.2d 1370, 1380 (Mass. 1980) (ruling out forms of bad faith in determining that a 
company acted in good faith and lawfully terminated an agreement). 
 24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 (1981). 
 25. Summers, Good Faith, supra note 1. 
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the most influential in modern contract law.”26  The central thesis of my 
article was adopted in the Restatement.27  The official comments to the 
Restatement specifically endorse my conceptualization of good faith as 
what I called “an excluder”: “The phrase ‘good faith’ is used in a variety 
of contexts, and its meaning varies somewhat with the context. . . .  
[I]t excludes a variety of types of conduct characterized as involving 
‘bad faith’ because they violate community standards of decency, 
fairness or reasonableness.”28 
In the 1982 article in the Cornell Law Review that I wrote on good 
faith as an “excluder,” I provided an account of six major types of 
conceptualization in the law, one of which is of the excluder type, and I 
focused in detail in that article on the general nature of excluder 
conceptualizations.29  I will not repeat those analyses here. 
V.  THE “EXCLUDER” ANALYSIS AND THE U.C.C. 
Unlike the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, the U.C.C. text in 
section 1-203, in related U.C.C. sections, and in official comments, does 
not explicitly adopt my excluder conceptualization of the obligation of 
good faith.  However, my law review articles articulating the excluder 
analysis of good faith are cited in various U.C.C. cases.30  The reader 
may also consult the four volumes of White and Summers, The Uniform 
Commercial Code’s treatment of good faith in text and footnotes.31 
 
 26. Houh, Empty Vessel, supra note 10, at 5. 
 27. See Robert Braucher, Interpretation and Legal Effect in the Second Restatement of 
Contracts, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 13, 15 (1981) (“[Restatement s]ection 205 states that every 
contract imposes upon each party a duty of good faith and fair dealing in its performance 
and its enforcement. . . .  [This principle’s] elaboration in the comment owes a great deal 
to the work of Professor Summers.”). 
 28. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. a (1981).  Cf. Summers, Good 
Faith, supra note 1, at 201 (“[G]ood faith is an ‘excluder.’  It is a phrase without general 
meaning (or meanings) of its own and serves to exclude a wide range of heterogeneous 
forms of bad faith.”). 
 29. See articles cited supra note 1, and J. AUSTIN, SENSE AND SENSIBILIA (G.J. 
Warnock ed., 1962), cited therein. 
 30. See supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 31. WHITE & SUMMERS, supra note 7. 
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VI.  SOME POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO THE GOOD FAITH DOCTRINE              
AND THE “EXCLUDER” ANALYSIS 
Various published objections have been put forth to the good faith 
doctrine and to my “excluder” analysis of good faith.  I will now merely 
address in general terms only two of these objections.  I will also ignore 
various distortions and misinterpretations that also appear in the 
literature. 
First, it has been contended that the notion of good faith as a conception 
excluding bad faith is essentially question begging and also affords 
insufficient general guidance.32  I offer several responses here.  The 
“excluder” analysis does focus first and specifically on any possible bad 
faith ruled out, and the reasons that may be given for so ruling in 
specific circumstances.  This kind of initially “merely negative” focus is, 
however, itself very specific and thus provides its own detailed form of 
guidance.  Moreover, an individual judge, lawyer, or scholar who happens 
to be intellectually more at home with so-called positive rather than 
negative conceptions can also readily construct, for any such specific 
“negative” form of bad faith so ruled out, a corresponding and relatedly 
specific positive form of good faith, and can then, if this happens to be 
intellectually more congenial, work from there, directly or by way of 
analogy to determine whether the action or inaction at hand is or is not in 
good faith.  Moreover, in a concrete case, a specific reason or specific 
reasons can be given—as courts commonly do—for ruling out particular 
behavior as an instance of bad faith, and such reason or reasons so given 
can provide further guidance not only in the case at hand, but in future, 
sufficiently similar cases, too.  Such a reason or reasons can also be faithfully 
reformulated to support recognition of the corresponding specific form 
of good faith involved.  As a very simple and straightforward example, 
consider the form of bad faith in illustration 6 in comment d to 
Restatement section 205: “A contracts to perform services for B for such 
compensation, ‘as you in your sole judgment, may decide is reasonable.’  
After A has performed the services, B refuses to make any determination 
of the value of A’s services.  A is entitled to their value as determined by 
a court.”33  Here, it is plainly bad faith for B simply to make no determination.  
After all, B has agreed to make such a determination upon completion of 
A’s performance.  It is also plain enough how one would formulate the 
corresponding form of good faith performance that B was to render here: 
 
 32. See, e.g., Burton, Reply, supra note 10, at 508–09. 
 33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 205 cmt. d, illus. 6 (1981). 
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the exercise of reasonable judgment by B as to the value of A’s services.  
After all, this is what B has agreed to do. 
A second type of possible objection to the good faith doctrine is even 
more fundamental and is not itself frontally focused on the excluder 
conceptualization as such.  This objection is that any general requirement of 
good faith, however conceptualized, is essentially moralistic and to be 
opposed for that reason.  It is often not wholly clear what is meant by 
“moralistic” here.  If the objection is that good faith analysis necessarily 
becomes merely a matter of “personal morality” and so “subjective,” and 
therefore unpredictable in application, then there are several answers. 
First, if there really is something to the “merely subjective” objection, 
then the very considerable case law that has now accumulated today 
would very likely confirm it.  Yet I discern relatively little conflict in the 
case law as to what constitutes good faith (or bad faith).  Moreover, 
there is relatively little of what might be called overextension or under 
extension of good faith in the case law.  Indeed, outcomes are often quite 
predictable. 
Second, it is important to distinguish here between the truly moral and 
the merely moralistic.  Many truly moral ideas do generally inform the 
content of contract and commercial law, and desirably so.  The good 
faith requirement can certainly be characterized as a moral idea, though, 
as taken over in the law, it undergoes some specification or other 
alteration, as with almost any concept imported from outside the law.  
The good faith requirement derives force partly from the basic moral 
norm that promise makers should generally keep promises, a norm that 
applies both to express promises and to implicit ones.  Yet a significantly 
moral idea such as good faith, when adopted or recognized in contract 
law, does not thereby necessarily become transformed into a moralistic 
idea, with the negative implication that it is therefore objectionable.  If 
this were so, many contractual notions, in addition to good faith, would 
be so objectionable, for many contractual norms and notions in addition 
to good faith may be characterized as originally in whole or in part moral in 
nature.  As examples, one may cite notions of conscionable contract 
terms, notions of honest and nonfraudulent representations, and notions 
of the absence of duress or other undue coercion in contracting.  Anyone 
claiming the contrary in the case of good faith, as such, must accept the 
burden of showing how the partially moral nature of the good faith 
obligation makes it thus distinctively objectionable, and therefore unfit 
for importation into general contract law and the U.C.C.  I know of no 
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one who has shown as much, and there is vast literature on good faith.  
Moreover, I do not believe it can be shown that the partially moral 
nature of good faith necessarily makes it at all objectionable for adoption 
in the law. 
VII.  CONCLUSION 
I was privileged to meet Dick Speidel first in New York city in 1962 
at one of New York University Law School’s earliest summer seminars 
for teachers of law—this one for teachers of contracts.  Dick and I 
agreed to stay in touch thereafter.  And to my great good fortune, we did, 
indeed for the next forty-five years.  I was fortunate to have known him 
not only because he was certainly one of the most distinguished scholars 
and teachers of his generation with many academic and public service 
accomplishments to his name, but also because Dick was a great person 
who by nature was open and friendly.  The law school faculty world 
could use more of this type.  Indeed, Dick was open and friendly both at 
a distance and up close.  He was always ready to laugh, too.  No solemn 
and detached intellectual, he!  He was most kind and generous of spirit, 
too. 
I last saw Dick a few days before he died.  Jim White, my wife Dorothy, 
and I flew to Chicago to see him, knowing the end was near.  He was in 
a wheelchair, and he knew he had little time left.  We nevertheless had 
some good talk about our old times together and about much else.  
Dick’s usual attentiveness to the current work of his friends, and also his 
generous disposition, came out, too, even on this somber occasion.  
Because I knew Dick had not received a copy of my recent book—Form 
and Function in a Legal System—I brought along an inscribed copy and 
handed it to him.  He glanced at the inside briefly, and then looked up 
and said: “Thanks, Bob.  I recall you started this book about eight or 
nine years ago.”  I then said: “Yes—I’m a slow thinker.”  I remember his 
kind reply, word for word: “No, Bob—you are careful and reflective, and 
this is a big subject.”  Here, you have a glimpse of Dick’s close attentiveness 
to the doings of his friends, and a glimpse of his characteristically 
generous disposition.  Dick Speidel, with all his special attributes, will 
be missed by his family, by his friends, by his former students, by his 
colleagues, and by many others.  Another giant has fallen. 
 
